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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of joint
transmit precoding (TPC) matrix and receive filter matrix design
subject to both secrecy and per-transmitter power constraints in
the MIMO interference channel, where K legitimate transmitter-
receiver pairs communicate in the presence of an external
eavesdropper. Explicitly, we jointly design the TPC and receive
filter matrices based on the minimum total mean-squared error
(MT-MSE) criterion under a given and feasible information-
theoretic degrees of freedom. More specifically, we formulate
this problem by minimizing the total MSEs of the signals
communicated between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs,
whilst ensuring that the MSE of the signals decoded by the eaves-
dropper remains higher than a certain threshold. We demonstrate
that the joint design of the TPC and receive filter matrices
subject to both secrecy and transmit power constraints can be
accomplished by an efficient iterative distributed algorithm. The
convergence of the proposed iterative algorithm is characterized
as well. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed algorithm,
including both its secrecy rate and MSE, is characterized with
the aid of numerical results. We demonstrate that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the traditional interference alignment (IA)
algorithm in terms of both the achievable secrecy rate and the
MSE. As a benefit, secure communications can be guaranteed by
the proposed algorithm for the MIMO interference channel even
in the presence of a “sophisticated/strong” eavesdropper, whose
number of antennas is much higher than that of each legitimate
transmitter and receiver.
Index Terms—MIMO interference channel, total MSE, secure
communications, interference alignment, physical layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) techniques have at-
tracted significant research interests over the past two decades
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due to their huge potential of boosting the spectral efficiency
of wireless communication systems. Recently, the MIMO in-
terference channel, where K transmitter-receiver pairs having
multiple antennas at each entity communicate in parallel, has
become the centre of attention for the sake of maximizing the
sum rate of an interference-contaminated peer-to-peer (P2P)
multiuser network [1]–[5]. To elaborate a little further, in the
MIMO interference channel, each of the K multiple-antenna
transmitters only wants to communicate with its dedicated
multiple-antenna receiver, and each of the K receivers only
cares about the information arriving from the corresponding
transmitter [6], [7]. As a result, each transmitter-receiver link
is interfered by K−1 links, and in total there are K principal
links and K(K − 1) interference links constituting a MIMO
interference channel.
Despite numerous significant advances in wireless commu-
nications, due to the distributed nature of both the transmitters
and receivers [6], [7], the management of the interference in
the context of this interference channel still has numerous
open facets. Exceptions exist only for a few special cases:
i) when the interference is “very weak” [8]–[11], treating the
interference as noise is optimal, ii) and when the interference
is “very strong” [12]–[14], eliminating the interference with
the aid of multiuser/MIMO detection [6] is optimal1. This
landscape has been changed, however, by a recent break-
through, namely by the invention of interference alignment
(IA) [15]–[17]. The IA technique is proved optimal for the
specific scenario where the interference power is comparable
to that of the desired signal. With the aid of the IA technique,
theoretically the sum-capacity of interference networks using
limited time-, frequency- and spatial-domain radio resources,
can be increased linearly with the number of users, which is in
stark contrast to the conventional wisdom relying on the “cake-
cutting” style of multiuser resource allocation [17]. The basic
idea of IA is that of maximizing the interference-free space
for the desired signal, which is achieved by using carefully
designed transmit beamforming/precoding vectors for each
transmitter so that all the interference can be concentrated
roughly into one half of the signal space at each receiver,
leaving the other half available for the desired signal and free
of interference [17]–[21].
Although IA is an effective technique of managing the
1Note that the scenario where multiuser detection is applicable reduces to
an interfering multiple-access channel, which is simpler than the interference
channel.
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MIMO interference, when there is an external eavesdropper,
the resultant physical layer security problem remains a sig-
nificant challenge [22]–[27]. More specifically, in a wiretap
channel, when an external eavesdropper is capable of obtaining
the precoded channel state information (CSI) between itself
and the legitimate transmitters2, secure communications may
no longer be guaranteed. More particularly, if the eavesdropper
is “sophisticated”, namely when the number of the eavesdrop-
per antennas is higher than that of each legitimate transmitter
and receiver, the secrecy rate of the user compromised by the
eavesdropper may reduce to zero, which implies that the com-
munication of this user is insecure. Therefore, it is necessary
to develop an IA scheme that is capable of guaranteeing secure
wireless communications by explicitly taking into account the
secrecy constraints imposed by the eavesdropper.
The existing contributions on the joint study of IA and
secure communications mainly focused on the analysis and de-
sign of secure interference networks based on the information-
theoretic concept of achieving a certain maximum degrees of
freedom (DoF) [28]–[31]. In contrast to these DoF-based stud-
ies, the authors of [32] studied the achievable rate regions of
the MIMO interference channel where confidential messages
are sent to two receivers. However, the analysis was limited to
the two-user MIMO interference channel and no eavesdropper
was considered. Additionally, the authors of [33] presented a
quantitative evaluation of the secrecy rate that is achievable
in secure IA communications involving an eavesdropper. It
was shown in [33] that the traditional distributed IA scheme
is capable of obtaining a useful positive secrecy rate in the
MIMO interference channel under a very special condition,
where the number of antennas of each legitimate transmitter
and receiver is higher than or equal to that of the eavesdropper.
However, this approach fails to ensure secure communications
in the challenging IA scenario, where the number of antennas
of each legitimate transmitter and receiver is less than that of
the eavesdropper.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no open literature
addressing the transceiver analysis and design relying on the
joint optimization of the transmit precoding (TPC) matrix and
receive filter matrix conceived for secure communications in
the presence of an eavesdropper over the MIMO interference
channel. Motivated by this challenge, in this paper we aim
for providing an algorithm for the minimization of the total
mean-square error (MSE) in order to jointly design the TPC
and receive filter matrices.
The MSE-based transceiver design has been widely in-
vestigated both in traditional point-to-point and in multiuser
MIMO systems [4], [34]–[38]. Additionally, the authors of
[39]–[45] have conceived dedicated algorithms based on MSE
optimization both for the MIMO interference channel and
for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel [46]. However, the
secrecy constraints with respect to the eavesdropper were not
considered in [39]–[45]. Hence, in this paper, we propose an
iterative distributed minimum total-MSE (MT-MSE) algorithm
that jointly designs the TPC and receive filter matrices for
2The precoded CSI, namely the product of the precoding matrix and the
channel matrix, may be obtained by exploiting the pilots sent from the
legitimate transmitters.
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Fig. 1: K-user MIMO interference channels with an eavesdropper.
secure communications over the MIMO interference channel
in the presence of an external eavesdropper. This MT-MSE
algorithm is capable of striking a tradeoff between the grade
of security and the achievable interference mitigation for the
MIMO interference channel in multiple aspects. In particular,
it is capable of handling the minimization of the total MSE
of the recovered signals, while maintaining secure commu-
nications over the MIMO interference channel. Furthermore,
relying on the proposed MT-MSE algorithm we demonstrate
that a useful positive secrecy rate can be guaranteed even
for the challenging scenario, where there is a sophisticated
eavesdropper that has a higher number of antennas than each
legitimate transmitter and receiver. Additionally, both our
analytical and numerical results show that the proposed MT-
MSE algorithm converges after a few iterations to a constant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we describe the system model. In Section III, we
propose our MT-MSE algorithm for secure communications in
the IA-aided MIMO interference channel. The convergence of
our algorithm is characterized in Section IV, while numerical
results are provided in Section V for characterizing the per-
formance of the proposed algorithm. Finally, our conclusions
are provided in Section VI.
Notation: Throughout this paper, we use (·)∗ to represent
conjugate, (·)H Hermitian transpose (i.e. conjugate transpose),
Tr (·) the trace of a matrix, E {·} the expectation, ‖ · ‖F the
Frobenius norm of a matrix, ‖ · ‖ the 2-norm of a vector, | · | the
determinant, I the identity matrix, and 0 a matrix or vector
whose all entries are zeros. Furthermore, we use uppercase
bold-face letters for denoting matrices, while keeping the
lowercase bold-face for vectors and lowercase normal-face for
scalars.∇f (·) is invoked to denote the gradient of the function
f (·). CN (0, 1) represents the complex circularly symmetric
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. C
denotes the complex field.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the scenario of K-user MIMO
interference channels in the presence of an eavesdropper,
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as seen in Fig. 1, where the transmitter k, the receiver k
and the eavesdropper are equipped with Nk, Mk and Me
antennas, respectively, k = 1, · · · ,K. We have the following
system model from the perspective of Receiver k and the
eavesdropper:
yk =
K∑
l=1
Hklxl + zk, (1)
ye =
K∑
l=1
Helxl + ze, (2)
where yk ∈ C
Mk×1 is the received signal vector at Receiver k;
ye ∈ C
Me×1 is the received signal vector at the eavesdropper;
xl ∈ CNl×1 is the transmitted signal vector at Transmitter
l; Hkl ∈ C
Mk×Nl is the matrix of channel coefficients
between Transmitter l and Receiver k; Hel ∈ C
Me×Nl is
the matrix of channel coefficients between Transmitter l and
the eavesdropper, zk ∈ C
Mk×1 is the complex additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector at Receiver k with zero mean
and covariance matrix σ2kI, i.e. we have zk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2kI
)
;
ze ∈ C
Me×1 is the complex AWGN vector at the eavesdrop-
per, i.e. ze ∼ CN
(
0, σ2eI
)
.
To realize interference-free communications in these K
legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs, IA is employed. On the
transmitter side, Transmitter k uses the TPC matrix Vk ∈
C
Nk×dk to map the dk data symbols contained in sk to its Nk
transmit antennas according to
xk = Vksk, (3)
where the transmitted data symbols are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) so that we have E
{
sks
H
k
}
= I
and E
{
sks
H
l
}
= 0 (∀k 6= l); the TPC matrix Vk having
linearly independent columns is normalized to ensure that
‖ Vk ‖
2
F≤ pk , where pk is the transmit power at Transmitter
k. Rewriting (1) and (2), Receiver k and the eavesdropper
respectively observe the signals
yk = HkkVksk +
K∑
l 6=k
HklVlsl + zk, (4)
ye =
K∑
l=1
HelVlsl + ze. (5)
On the receiver side, Receiver k uses the receive filter matrix
Uk ∈ C
dk×Mk to obtain the estimate of the data symbols sk
according to:
sˆk = U
H
k HkkVksk +U
H
k
K∑
l 6=k
HklVlsl +U
H
k zk. (6)
Naturally, if no eavesdropper is present, these K legitimate
transmitter-receiver pairs are capable of achieving their max-
imum communication rates when an IA scheme is employed;
meanwhile the communications are reliable and secure. How-
ever, the reliable secure communications are no longer guar-
anteed in the presence of an eavesdropper, who is capa-
ble of compromising any of the transmitters’ transmissions.
Assuming that the eavesdropper can use the receive filter
matrix Ue,k (k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}), which is calculated by the
eavesdropper relying on minimizing its own detection MSE3,
the data symbols sk intended by Transmitter k to Receiver k
can be detected by the eavesdropper according to:
sˆe,k = U
H
e,kHkkVksk +U
H
e,k
K∑
l 6=k
HklVlsl +U
H
e,kze. (7)
That is, when the eavesdropper is present, the TPC matrix
Vk and the receive filter matrix Uk employed by Transmitter
k no longer guarantee maintaining the secrecy rate at which
transmitters can reliably send their secret messages to the
receivers. Hence, the set of the TPC and receive filter matrices
{Vk,Uk}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} must be recalculated. In order
to realize secrecy communications, as stated in Section I, we
minimize the total MSE of the signals received at all legitimate
receivers subject to the constraints that the MSE of the signal
recovered at the eavesdropper must be larger than a given
threshold and the maximum transmit power of each transmitter
is not exceeded.
III. SECURE MT-MSE ALGORITHM FOR THE MIMO
INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
In this section, we focus our attention on a common metric
in order to avoid enhancing the noise in the linear detectors of
MIMO systems, namely the MSE metric [6], [39]. According
to our MT-MSE algorithm, we jointly design the TPC and
receive filter matrices to solve the total MSE minimization
problem in the presence of an external eavesdropper. First, we
describe the total MSE objective with secrecy and transmit
power constraints for the MIMO interference channel. Our
second goal is to find the first-order optimality conditions with
respect to each TPC and receive filter matrix-pair. Finally, we
present our iterative distributed approach (i.e. the MT-MSE
algorithm) of obtaining the TPC and receive filter matrices.
We concentrate on MSE minimization owing to its attractive
performance-complexity tradeoff [6]. The TPC and receive
filter matrices {Vk,Uk}, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} will be designed
so that the total MSE of all receivers is minimized. Under
the assumption of independence between sk and zk, the error
covariance matrix ERxk ,Txk at Receiver k can be written as
(8).
Similarly, the error covariance matrix EEve,Txk at the eaves-
dropper who aims for wiretapping the data symbols sk sent
from Transmitter k to Receiver k is defined as (9).
We assume that the eavesdropper uses the well-known linear
MMSE receiver [6] for obtaining its receive filter matrix Ue,k,
which is formulated as
Ue,k =
(
K∑
i=1
HeiViV
H
i H
H
ei + σ
2
eI
)−1
HekVk, (10)
We consider the following total-MSE minimization prob-
3Uk and Ue,k are typically different from each other, since Receiver k and
the eavesdropper calculated their receive filter matrices relying on minimizing
their local detection MSE.
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ERxk ,Txk ,E
{
(ˆsk−sk) (ˆsk−sk)
H
}
=E
{
UHk
(
K∑
l=1
HklVlV
H
l H
H
kl
)
Uk−U
H
k HkkVk−V
H
k H
H
kkUk+σ
2
kU
H
k Uk+I
}
. (8)
EEve,Txk,E
{
(ˆse,k−sk)(ˆse,k−sk)
H
}
=E
{
UHe,k
(
K∑
i=1
HeiViV
H
i H
H
ei
)
Ue,k+I−U
H
e,kHekVk−V
H
k H
H
ekUe,k+σ
2
eU
H
e,kUe,k
}
. (9)
lem:
{V⋆k,U
⋆
k} = arg min
{Vk,Uk}
K∑
k=1
Tr (ERxk ,Txk ) , (11a)
s.t. Tr (EEve,Txk ) ≥ εk , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (11b)
‖ Vk ‖
2
F≤ pk ,∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (11c)
where {V⋆k,U
⋆
k} is the solution obtained, Tr (ERxk ,Txk ) is
the MSE at Receiver k, Tr (EEve,Txk ) is the MSE at the
eavesdropper who aims for wiretapping the data symbols sk
sent from Transmitter k to Receiver k, εk is the threshold of
the eavesdropper MSE, and pk is the maximum transmit power
constraint imposed on Transmitter k.
The Lagrangian of the optimization problem (11) is given
by
L (Vk,Uk, µk, λk) ,
K∑
k=1
Tr (ERxk ,Txk )
+
K∑
k=1
µk[εk−Tr (EEve,Txk )]+
K∑
k=1
λk
[
Tr
(
VkV
H
k
)
−pk
]
, (12)
where µk and λk are the Lagrange multipliers concerning the
MSE constraint of the eavesdropper and the transmit power
constraint of Transmitter k, respectively. In order to obtain
the optimal solution of Problem (11), the following Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions have to be satisfied:
Stationarity:
∇V∗
k
L ,
∂
∑
K
k=1 Tr (ERxk ,Txk )
∂V∗k
+
∂
∑
K
k=1 µk [εk − Tr (EEve,Txk )]
∂V∗k
+
∂
∑
K
k=1 λk
[
Tr
(
VkV
H
k
)
− pk
]
∂V∗k
= 0, (13)
∇U∗
k
L ,
∂
∑K
k=1 Tr (ERxk ,Txk )
∂U∗k
+
∂
∑K
k=1 µk [εk − Tr (EEve,Txk )]
∂U∗k
+
∂
∑K
k=1 λk
[
Tr
(
VkV
H
k
)
− pk
]
∂U∗k
= 0, (14)
Primal feasibility:
Tr
(
VkV
H
k
)
− pk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (15)
εk − Tr (EEve,Txk ) ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (16)
Dual feasibility:
λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (17)
µk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (18)
Complementary slackness:
λk
[
Tr
(
VkV
H
k
)
− pk
]
= 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (19)
µk [εk − Tr (EEve,Txk )] = 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (20)
By substituting (8) as well as (9) into (13) and by exploiting
the matrix derivative [47], [48], we have:
∇V∗
k
L =
K∑
k=1
(
HHlkUlU
H
l Hlk
)
Vk −H
H
kkUk + λkVk
− µk
(
HH
ek
Ue,kU
H
e,kHekVk −H
H
ek
Ue,k
)
=
[
K∑
k=1
(
HH
lk
UlU
H
l Hlk
)
−µkH
H
ek
Ue,kU
H
e,kHek+λkI
]
Vk
−HH
kk
Uk − µkH
H
ek
Ue,k = 0. (21)
Similarly, (14) can be simplified as:
∇U∗
k
L =
(
K∑
k=1
HklVlV
H
l H
H
kl
+ σ2kI
)
Uk −HkkVk = 0.
(22)
Finally, according to the above derivations of the first-order
optimality conditions with respect to each {Vk,Uk} , k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K}, the optimum solution of Problem (11) has to
satisfy (23) and
Uk =
(
K∑
k=1
HklVlV
H
l H
H
kl
+ σ2kI
)−1
HkkVk, (24)
where λk ≥ 0 and µk ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} should be
chosen so that the complementary slackness conditions of (19)
and (20) are satisfied. By observing (23) and (24), we find that
the optimal TPC and receive filter matrices {Vk,Uk} depend
on each other. More explicitly, each TPC matrix Vk depends
on all the receive filter matrices {Uk}, while each receive filter
matrix Uk depends on all the TPC matrices {Vk} as well.
Hence, it remains an open challenge to obtain the closed-form
expressions for each TPC matrix Vk and receive filter matrix
Uk. In what follows, a feasible approach, namely the MT-MSE
algorithm in whichVk andUk can be iteratively calculated, is
proposed for determining {Vk,Uk}. For clarity, the MT-MSE
algorithm proposed for secure communications in the MIMO
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Vk =
[
K∑
k=1
(
HH
lk
UlU
H
l Hlk
)
− µkH
H
ek
Ue,kU
H
e,kHek + λkI
]−1 (
HH
kk
Uk − µkH
H
ek
Ue,k
)
(23)
interference channel is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Here, we assume that the global CSI is available at all
transmitters, which is feasible for both the frequency-division
duplex (FDD) and the time-division duplex (TDD) based IA
systems4, as shown in [19]. Consequently, each transmitter
is capable of calculating its TPC matrix. To elaborate a little
further, Transmitter k starts with a random TPC matrix, which
is generated according to CN (0, 1) and then normalized in
order to satisfy the transmit power constraint. At the receiver k
and the eavesdropper, Uk and Ue,k are respectively calculated
according to the MMSE criterion of (10). At the transmitter k,
we consider the challenging situation where the eavesdropper
is capable of calculating its receive filter matrix Ue,k accord-
ing to the MMSE criterion of (10). The major part of our MT-
MSE algorithm, which describes how to calculate the TPC
matrix, is summarized as follows.
1) Firstly, the Lagrange multiplier λk is calculated accord-
ing to the transmit power constraint characterized by
(11c) and (19). Then, we use the above λk to calculate
and update the intermediate result of the TPC matrix, as
shown in (28).
2) Secondly, the Lagrange multiplier µk is calculated ac-
cording to the intermediate result of the TPC matrix
obtained above and to the MSE constraint, which is
characterized by (11b) and (20).
3) Finally, we obtain the TPC matrix by substituting the
above λk and µk into (32). The details of our MT-MSE
algorithm are presented in Algorithm 1.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF THE PROPOSED SECURE MT-MSE
ALGORITHM
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed MT-
MSE algorithm is guaranteed to converge. Since the TPC
matrices {Vk} and receive filter matrices {Uk} are iter-
atively calculated at each iteration of the proposed MT-
MSE algorithm, the value of the total-MSE objective func-
tion
∑
K
k=1 Tr (ERxk ,Txk ) is monotonically reduced. The strict
proof of the convergence is as follows.
4Obtaining the CSI of the unintended receiver (e.g. the eavesdropper)
requires careful attention. Note that typically an eavesdropper has to commu-
nicate with the legitimate transmitter, e.g. a base station (BS), at some time
instance to obtain certain a priori information in support of its subsequent
malicious signal processing. For example, the eavesdropper has to estimate its
own CSIHei, as shown in (10), to calculate its own receive filter matrixUe,k .
In other words, an eavesdropper may also be a legitimate terminal of a network
during a particular observation period different from the current one [32]. As a
result, the eavesdropper can be regarded as a so-called “active eavesdropper”,
which also occasionally transmit feedback or pilot signals rather than just
passively overhearing the signals of legitimate transmitters. Therefore, the
techniques introduced in [19] can be used for obtaining the eavesdropper’s
CSI. More details about the availability of the eavesdropper’s CSI are also
discussed in [28], [32]. Furthermore, for fast time-varying fading channels
where accurate CSI is difficult to obtain, the eavesdropper’s outdated CSI
and statistical CSI may still be attainable at the legitimate transmitters for
optimizing the TPC matrix.
For given values of the TPC matrices {Vk}, the total-MSE
minimization problem (11) can be reformulated as:
{U⋆k} = arg min
Uk
K∑
k=1
Tr (ERxk ,Txk ) , (33a)
s.t. Tr (EEve,Txk ) ≥ εk , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (33b)
The solution to this constrained optimization problem (33) is
given by (24). Hence, we have (34):
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
ERxk ,Txk
(
V
(n)
k ,U
(n+1)
k
)]
≤
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
ERxk ,Txk
(
V
(n)
k ,U
(n)
k
)]
. (34)
Likewise, given the values of the receive filter matrices
{Uk}, the total-MSE minimization problem (11) can be
rewritten as:
{V⋆k} = arg min
Vk
K∑
k=1
Tr (ERxk ,Txk ) , (35a)
s.t. Tr (EEve,Txk ) ≥ εk , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (35b)
‖ Vk ‖
2
F≤ pk , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. (35c)
The solution to this constrained optimization problem (35) is
given by (23). Similarly, we have (36):
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
ERxk ,Txk
(
V
(n+1)
k ,U
(n+1)
k
)]
≤
K∑
k=1
Tr
[
ERxk ,Txk
(
V
(n)
k ,U
(n+1)
k
)]
. (36)
From the above (34) and (36), it may be readily seen that
the value of the total MSE of all receivers is monotonically
reduced after each iteration. This conclusion is also demon-
strated by the numerical results of Fig. 2, which illustrates the
convergence behavior of the MT-MSE algorithm in the MIMO
interference network considered, where we have SNR = 25dB,
K = 3, as well as diverse values of Mk, Nk and Me. The
plot shows that the total MSE of all receivers under the three
different antenna configurations considered always converges
within about 6 ∼ 7 iterations and it does indeed monotonically
decrease upon increasing the number of iterations, as shown
by the above analytical results. Therefore, the convergence
of the MT-MSE algorithm is guaranteed. Moreover, the plot
also shows that the total MSE increases upon increasing
the number of eavesdropper antennas. This is because the
MT-MSE algorithm limits the detection performance of the
“sophisticated/strong” eavesdropper at the expense of increas-
ing the total MSE of the legitimate receivers. Additionally,
when the ratio of the number of antennas at each legitimate
transmitter/receiver to that of the eavesdropper is increased,
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed Secure Iterative Distributed MT-MSE Algorithm (Part I)
1. Initialization: set the iteration counter to n = 0, and start with an arbitrary TPC matrix V
(n)
k = V
(0)
k , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
2. Begin the iteration: calculate and update U
(n+1)
k and U
(n+1)
e,k according to the MMSE receiver criterion of (10). Then we have
U
(n+1)
k =
[
K∑
l=1
HklV
(n)
l
(
V
(n)
l
)H
H
H
kl + σ
2
kI
]
−1
HkkV
(n)
k , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (25)
U
(n+1)
e,k =
[
K∑
i=1
HeiV
(n)
i
(
V
(n)
i
)H
H
H
ei + σ
2
eI
]
−1
HekV
(n)
k , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (26)
3. Calculate and update λˆ
(n+1)
k :
i. if n = 0, use the given µ
(0)
k , else use µ
(n)
k that has been calculated.
ii. Calculate λˆ
(n+1)
k according to the equation Tr
[
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
(
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
)H]
= pk , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} (the solution of λˆ
(n+1)
k is
detailed in Appendix A), where
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
(
λˆ
(n+1)
k
)
=
{
K∑
k=1
[
H
H
lkU
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
− µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
Hek + λˆ
(n+1)
k I
}
−1
×
(
H
H
kkU
(n+1)
k − µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (27)
4. Update λ
(n+1)
k according to λ
(n+1)
k = max
(
λˆ
(n+1)
k , 0
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} .
5. Calculate and update the intermediate result of the TPC matrix V¯
(n+1)
k according to
V¯
(n+1)
k =
{
K∑
l=1
[
H
H
lkU
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
− µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
Hek
+λ
(n+1)
k I
}
−1 (
H
H
kkU
(n+1)
k − µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (28)
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Fig. 2: Convergence example of the MT-MSE algorithm. We have K = 3,
SNR = 25dB and the specific SNR definition is given in Section V.
the total MSE of the legitimate receivers is reduced, since the
relative strength of the eavesdropper erodes.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we conduct a range of numerical simula-
tions to evaluate the performance of the proposed MT-MSE
algorithm presented in Section III for the MIMO interference
channel. Here we consider a three-user MIMO interference
channel, where the number of transmit and receive antennas is
identical at each of all the legitimate transmitter-receiver pairs.
All channel coefficients are assumed to be i.i.d. zero-mean
unit-variance complex-valued Gaussian random variables. The
transmitted power at each transmitter is the same, i.e. we
have p1 = p2 = p3. The noise power at all receivers and
the eavesdropper is also identical. We define the signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) (in dB) as the ratio of the received signal
power at a single receiver over the noise power, i.e. we
have SNR = 10 log10 pk/σ
2
k. To demonstrate the security and
effectiveness of our MT-MSE algorithm in comparison to the
traditional IA algorithm [33], [49], we intentionally opt for
assuming the presence of a sophisticated eavesdropper, whose
number of antennas Me is higher than that of each legitimate
transmitter and receiver. To guarantee secure communications,
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Algorithm 1 The Proposed Secure Iterative Distributed MT-MSE Algorithm (Part II)
6. Calculate and update µ
(n+1)
k and the final result of the TPC matrix V
(n+1)
k :
i. Set k = 1.
ii. if k = 1, solve for µ˜
(n+1)
k relying on Tr
{
EEve,Txk
[
V˜
(n+1)
k
(
µ˜
(n+1)
k
)]}
= εk .
⇒Tr
{(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H [ K∑
i=2
HeiV¯
(n+1)
i
(
V¯
(n+1)
i
)H
H
H
ei
]
U
(n+1)
e,k
+
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
HeiV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
H
H
eiU
(n+1)
e,k −
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
HekV˜
(n+1)
k
−
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k + σ
2
e
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
U
(n+1)
e,k + I
}
= εk . (29)
else
use the calculated V
(n+1)
i that is the matrix function of µ
(n+1)
i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, and solve for µ˜
(n+1)
k from
Tr
{
EEve,Txk
[
V˜
(n+1)
k
(
µ˜
(n+1)
k
)]}
= εk .
⇒Tr
{(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H [k−1∑
i=1
HeiV
(n+1)
i
(
V
(n+1)
i
)H
H
H
ei
]
U
(n+1)
e,k
+
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H [ K∑
i=k+1
HeiV¯
(n+1)
i
(
V¯
(n+1)
i
)H
H
H
ei
]
U
(n+1)
e,k
+
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
HeiV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
H
H
eiU
(n+1)
e,k −
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
HekV˜
(n+1)
k
−
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k + σ
2
e
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
U
(n+1)
e,k + I
}
= εk . (30)
end
According to (29) or (30), we obtain µ˜
(n+1)
k =
{
µ˜
(n+1)
k | Tr
{
EEve,TXk
[
V˜
(n+1)
k
(
µ˜
(n+1)
k
)]}
= εk
}
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} (the
solution of µ˜
(n+1)
k is detailed in Appendix B), where
V˜
(n+1)
k =
{
K∑
l=1
[
H
H
lkU
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
− µ˜
(n+1)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
Hek
+λ
(n+1)
k I
}
−1 (
H
H
kkU
(n+1)
k − µ˜
(n+1)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (31)
iii. Update µ
(n+1)
k according to µ
(n+1)
k = max
(
µ˜
(n+1)
k , 0
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
iv. According to the above µ
(n+1)
k , calculate and update the final result of the TPC matrix V
(n+1)
k according to
V
(n+1)
k =
{
K∑
l=1
[
H
H
lkU
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
− µ
(n+1)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
Hek
+λ
(n+1)
k I
}
−1 (
H
H
kkU
(n+1)
k − µ
(n+1)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
)
, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (32)
v. k ← k + 1. Repeat step ii, iii, iv and v until k > K.
7. Repeat Step 2 through 6 until V
(n+1)
k satisfies the transmit power constraint and the algorithm has converged.
we set the threshold of the eavesdropper’s MSE to εk > 1 [46],
[50], for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Here we evaluate the scenario
where the number of transmit and receive antennas at each
legitimate transmitter and receiver is identical, i.e. we have
Nk = Mk = M , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
For the above scenario, the rate (bits/second/Hertz) corre-
sponding to the sth data stream of the transmitter-receiver pair
k is given by
R
(s)
k = log2
1 +
∥∥∥UH
k(s)HkkVk(s)
∥∥∥2
Z
(s)
k
 , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} ,
(37)
where Vk(s) is the TPC vector for the sth data stream of
the transmitter-receiver pair k and the numerator of the right-
hand side is the desired signal power, while the first, second
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and third terms of the denominator Z
(s)
k that is given by
Z
(s)
k ,
dk∑
t=1
t 6=s
∥∥∥UHk(s)HkkVk(t)∥∥∥2+ K∑
l=1
l 6=k
dl∑
t=1
∥∥∥UHk(s)HklVl(t)∥∥∥2+σ2k,
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (38)
represent the inter-stream interference, the multiuser interfer-
ence and the AWGN, respectively. Additionally, in (38) Vl(t)
is the TPC vector for the tth data stream of the transmitter-
receiver pair l, and Uk(s) is the receive filter vector for the
sth data stream of the transmitter-receiver pair k.
Secure communications can be realized when the commu-
nication rate between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair
is higher than that of the transmitter-eavesdropper link. The
difference between these two rates is the so-called “secrecy
rate”, which is invoked in this paper for the performance
evaluation of secure communications. Explicitly, the secrecy
rate of Receiver k is defined as
Sk , Rk −Rk ,Eve
,
dk∑
s=1
R
(s)
k −
dk∑
s=1
log2
1 +
∥∥∥UH
e,k(s)HekVk(s)
∥∥∥2
UH
e,k(s)Υ
(s)
ekUe,k(s)
 ,
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (39)
where we have
Υ
(s)
ek ,
dk∑
l=1
HelVlV
H
l
HH
el
−HekVk(s)V
H
k(s)H
H
ek
+ σ2kI,
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (40)
and Ue,k(s) is the eavesdropper’s wiretap receive filter vector
for the sth data stream of the transmitter-receiver pair k.
Fig. 3(a) and (b) characterize the rate and the MSE perfor-
mance, respectively, of our MT-MSE algorithm in the presence
of a sophisticated eavesdropper for the MIMO interference
channel, where we have M = 4, Me = 6 and εk = 1.5. The
maximum DoF of 4 can indeed be achieved, which implies that
each transmitter can attain a DoF of two [51]. In the MIMO
interference network model considered, statistically there is
no difference among the three legitimate transmitter-receiver
pairs. Therefore, without any loss of generality we evaluate
both the secrecy rate and the MSE between Transmitter 1 and
Receiver 1 as a representative of the legitimate transmitter-
receiver pairs. Fig. 3(a) portrays the achievable communication
rate and secrecy rate versus the SNR for different algorithms.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), the MT-MSE algorithm is capable
of supporting a useful positive secrecy rate, which increases
as the SNR increases. By contrast, the traditional IA algo-
rithm [33], [49] fails to guarantee secure communications
in the scenario having a sophisticated eavesdropper, since
the secrecy rate achieved by the traditional IA algorithm is
zero. Although the achievable communication rate between the
legitimate Transmitter 1 and Receiver 1 upon using the MT-
MSE algorithm is lower than that of using the traditional IA
algorithm5, the MT-MSE algorithm is capable of guaranteeing
secure communications right across the entire SNR region.
In other words, the MT-MSE algorithm sacrifices a certain
fraction of its potentially attainable communication rate for
the sake of achieving a useful positive secrecy rate of data
transmission.
Furthermore, we can see in Fig. 3(b) that upon using our
MT-MSE algorithm, the eavesdropper’s MSE remains above
the given threshold of εk = 1.5, and it is higher than the
MSE of the legitimate Receiver 1 under all the SNR conditions
considered. We can also observe that the eavesdropper’s MSE
increases quite rapidly in the high SNR region, because the
impact of the interference becomes more dominant than that of
the noise. By contrast, both the MSE of the legitimate Receiver
1 and the total MSE of all the legitimate receivers decrease
upon increasing the SNR. Hence, the communication rate of
each legitimate transmitter-receiver pair becomes higher than
that of the transmitter-eavesdropper link. As a beneficial result,
secure communications can be realized.
In addition to investigating the “sophisticated eavesdrop-
per” scenario in Fig. 3, in Fig. 4 we also quantify the
performance of the MT-MSE algorithm in the presence of an
“unsophisticated eavesdropper”, which has an identical, lower
or slightly higher number of antennas than each legitimate
transmitter and receiver. Similar observations can be made for
this unsophisticated/weak eavesdropper scenario in the context
of the MIMO interference channel, as shown in Fig. 4(a) and
Fig. 4(b), where the number of eavesdropper antennas is set to
Me = 4 andMe = 5, respectively, while the MSE-threshold is
set to εk = 1.5. The results given in Fig. 4(a) and (b) indicate
that the MT-MSE algorithm is capable of guaranteeing secure
communications for all the SNRs considered. In particular,
although the traditional IA algorithm is secure in the scenario
of having an unsophisticated eavesdropper, the proposed MT-
MSE algorithm exhibits a more appealing secrecy performance
than the traditional IA algorithm in the low to medium SNR
regions. We observe from Fig. 4(a) and (b) that the SNR
“divide” between the secrecy rates achieved by the MT-
MSE algorithm and the traditional IA algorithm is about 15
dB and 10 dB, respectively. In fact, when the number of
antennas at each legitimate transmitter and receiver, i.e. M ,
is no lower than that of the eavesdropper Me, the traditional
IA algorithm remains secure, because the eavesdropper no
longer has a sufficiently high number of spatial dimensions
to facilitate successful signal detection in the IA system6 [33].
This statement is true even when Me is slightly larger than
M , for example, the configuration of “Me = 5,M = 4”
investigated in Fig. 4(a).
Furthermore, in Fig. 5(a) and (b) we characterize the varia-
tion of the secrecy rate and the maximum achievable received
5This is because our MT-MSE algorithm strikes a compromise between the
attainable communication rate and secrecy rate.
6In this scenario, excessive residual interference is imposed on the eaves-
dropper. This residual interference cannot be reduced by any arbitrary decod-
ing matrices, since the number of dimensions required by decoding/detection
is lower than the number of dimensions of the interference signal subspace.
As a result, the IA system operating in the presence of an“unsophisticated
eavesdropper” is secure in nature. Therefore, in Fig. 4 we did not provide the
numerical results for the scenario of M > Me.
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Fig. 3: Communication rate, secrecy rate and MSE versus SNR performance comparison of the proposed MT-MSE algorithm and the traditional IA algorithm
[33], [49] in the presence of a “sophisticated eavesdropper”, where we have M = 4, Me = 6 and εk = 1.5.
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Fig. 4: Communication rate and secrecy rate versus SNR performance comparison of the proposed MT-MSE algorithm and the traditional IA algorithm [33],
[49] in the presence of an “unsophisticated eavesdropper”, where we have M = 4 and εk = 1.5.
rate between the legitimate Transmitter 1 and the eavesdropper,
both as a function of the number of eavesdropper antennas
Me and as that of the SNR, where the MT-MSE algorithm
is employed and we have M = 4 as well as εk = 1.5. Fig.
5(a) portrays the variation of the secrecy rate. As shown in
Fig. 5(a), the secrecy rate attained decreases as the number
of eavesdropper antennas is increased and as the SNR is
decreased. Furthermore, the decrease of the attainable secrecy
rate becomes slow when the number of eavesdropper antennas
is relatively large (e.g. Me ≥ 8), which implies that the
achievable secrecy rate approaches the lower bound of zero
as long as the number of eavesdropper antennas becomes suf-
ficiently large. It can be observed that in general the MT-MSE
algorithm remains secure even in the challenging scenario
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Fig. 5: The variation of the secrecy rate and the maximum achievable received rate between a legitimate transmitter and the eavesdropper when the proposed
MT-MSE algorithm is invoked, where we have M = 4 and εk = 1.5.
of having a sophisticated eavesdropper, which is equipped
with a larger number of antennas (i.e. 4 < Me < 15) than
each legitimate transmitter and receiver. However, even the
MT-MSE algorithm fails to guarantee secure communications
when the number of eavesdropper antennas satisfies Me ≥ 15.
When the number of eavesdropper antennas is increased, the
number of dimensions available for signal detection/decoding
at the eavesdropper is also increased. In this situation, the
eavesdropper becomes capable of simultaneously decoding
multiple signals, which are mutually interfering with each
other. As a result, the eavesdropper becomes capable of
wiretapping the transmitted data and hence the achievable
secrecy rate becomes zero.
Fig. 5(b) portrays the variation of the maximum achievable
received rate between the legitimate Transmitter 1 and the
eavesdropper versus both the SNR and the number of eaves-
dropper antennas. It can be seen that this rate increases as
the number of eavesdropper antennas is increased, albeit the
rate increases only slowly when the number of eavesdropper
antennas is relatively high. Additionally, this rate first increases
substantially as the SNR increases, but after reaching its peak
value the rate is slightly reduced at the high SNRs considered.
This is because the eavesdropper MSE is increased when the
SNR is high.
Fig. 6 shows the secrecy rate comparison between the MT-
MSE algorithm and the traditional IA algorithm, when the
number of eavesdropper antennas Me is varied. In Fig. 6,
the SNR is fixed to 10 dB and the number of antennas of
each legitimate transmitter and receiver is set to M = 2 or
M = 4. Again, as shown in Fig. 6, the MT-MSE algorithm
outperforms the traditional IA algorithm, when the number of
eavesdropper antennas is higher than the number of antennas at
each legitimate transmitter and receiver. By contrast, they ex-
hibit a similar performance when the number of eavesdropper
antennas is equal to the number of antennas at each legitimate
transmitter and receiver. It can also be observed in Fig. 6
that the secrecy rate achieved by the traditional IA algorithm
decreases rapidly as the number of eavesdropper antennas
Me is increased. However, the secrecy rate achieved by the
MT-MSE algorithm is reduced much slower than that of the
traditional IA algorithm. This is because we recalculate both
the TPC and receive filter matrices to guarantee that the eaves-
dropper’s MSE is above the given threshold. By contrast, the
eavesdropper’s MSE decreases upon increasing the SNR in the
traditional IA approach. Numerically, for theM = 2 orM = 4
MIMO interference channel, the secrecy rate achieved by the
traditional IA algorithm reduces to zero, when the number of
eavesdropper antennas Me is higher than 2 or 5, respectively.
However, in the above MIMO interference channel, the secrecy
rate achieved by the MT-MSE algorithm is reduced to zero
when the number of eavesdropper antennas Me is higher than
4 or 15, respectively. In general, the MT-MSE algorithm has
a more appealing security performance than the traditional IA
algorithm in the presence of a sophisticated eavesdropper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated secure communications for
a K-user MIMO interference channel in the presence of an
eavesdropper. An iterative distributed total MSE minimization
algorithm, namely the MT-MSE algorithm of Section III, has
been proposed for achieving secure communications. The pro-
posed MT-MSE algorithm jointly designs the TPC and receive
filter matrices by minimizing the total MSE of all receivers
subject to specific secrecy and transmit power constraints. We
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Fig. 6: Secrecy rate performance comparison versus the number of eavesdrop-
per antennas for the case of SNR=10 dB.
also demonstrated the convergence of the proposed MT-MSE
algorithm. Our simulation results demonstrated that secure
communications can be guaranteed by using the proposed MT-
MSE algorithm even in the challenging scenario of having a
“sophisticated/strong eavesdropper”, while the traditional IA
algorithm becomes insecure in this scenario. Our simulation
results also showed that the proposed MT-MSE algorithm
outperforms the traditional IA algorithm in both the low and
medium SNR regions when an “unsophisticated/weak eaves-
dropper” was considered. In general, the proposed MT-MSE
algorithm is capable of improving the secrecy rate performance
of the MIMO interference channel compared to the traditional
IA scheme.
APPENDIX A
CALCULATE λˆ
(n+1)
k
In Step 3-ii of MT-MSE algorithm, λˆ
(n+1)
k can be derived
from the second constraint of (11) at the (n+ 1)-th iteration,
i.e. solving the following equation
Tr
[
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
(
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
)H]
= pk , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} , (41)
where Vˆ
(n+1)
k is the function of the variable λˆ
(n+1)
k and is
given by (27). In (27), Uˆ
(n+1)
l and Uˆ
(n+1)
e,k are updated at the
beginning of the (n+ 1)-th iteration, while µ
(n)
k is calculated
during the n-th iteration. For the sake of convenience, we
define:
Ψ
(n+1)
k
,
K∑
k=1
[
HHlkU
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
− µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
Hek
, P
(n+1)
k
Σ
(n+1)
k
(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
, (42)
Θ
(n+1)
k , H
H
kkU
(n+1)
k − µ
(n)
k H
H
ekU
(n+1)
e,k , (43)
where P
(n+1)
k
Σ
(n+1)
k
(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
is the result of the singular
value decomposition of the Hermitian matrix Ψ
(n+1)
k
.
Substituting (27), (42) and (43) into the right-
hand side of (41), we get (44), where we have
exploited the matrix inversion lemma7 to simplify[
P
(n+1)
k
Σ
(n+1)
k
(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
+ λˆ
(n+1)
k I
]−1
. Therefore, it
is found that λˆ
(n+1)
k can be easily solved according to (44).
APPENDIX B
CALCULATE µ˜
(n+1)
k
In Step 6 of the MT-MSE algorithm, after solving λˆ
(n+1)
k ,
we employ the updated λ
(n+1)
k and intermediate result V¯
(n+1)
k
given by (28) to solve µ˜
(n+1)
k from the first constraint of (11)
at the (n+ 1)-th iteration. Here, we define Ω
(n+1)
k
as (45),
where V¯
(n+1)
i ,V
(n+1)
i ,Ψ
(n+1)
i
andΘ
(n+1)
i are given by (28),
(32), (42) and (43), respectively. Let
Φ
(n+1)
k ,
K∑
l=1
[
HH
lk
U
(n+1)
l
(
U
(n+1)
l
)H
Hlk
]
+λ
(n+1)
k I, (46)
M
(n+1)
k , H
H
kk
U
(n+1)
k , (47)
N
(n+1)
k , H
H
ek
U
(n+1)
e,k . (48)
Then, according to (45) ∼ (48) and to the KKT conditions of
(18) ∼ (20), the value of µ˜
(n+1)
k satisfying the MSE constraint
of (11) can be found as (49), where Ω
(n+1)
k
is a predefined
constant item with respect to µ˜
(n+1)
k ; V˜
(n+1)
k is the function
of µ˜
(n+1)
k and is given by (27). For the sake of convenience,
we use µ˜k, Ω, Φ, M and N instead of µ˜
(n+1)
k , Ω
(n+1)
k
,
Φ
(n+1)
k
, M
(n+1)
k and N
(n+1)
k in the following mathematical
derivations, respectively. By employing the matrix inversion
lemma, V˜
(n+1)
k in (49) can be rewritten as:
V˜
(n+1)
k =
[
Φ−1−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ−µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
(M−µ˜kN), (50)
where ΓΛΓH is the result of the singular value
decomposition of the Hermitian matrix NHΦ−1N. For
solving µ˜k from (49), it is readily observed that Tr [Ω],
Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
, Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
]
and
Tr
[(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
should be calculated. Furthermore, since
Tr [Ω] is a constant item with respect to µ˜k, we will elaborate
on the other three items in the following.
Firstly, upon substituting (50) into
Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
, we arrive at (51).
We further simplify the first item of (51) as (52), where
Ξ , NHΦ−1MHMΦ−1N. Furthermore, the second item of
(51) can be simplified as (53), where Π , ΓHMHΦ−1NΓ.
7We have
(
A+CBCT
)
−1
= A−1 −
A−1C
(
B−1 +CTA−1C
)
−1
CTA−1.
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Tr
[
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
(
Vˆ
(n+1)
k
)H]
= Tr
{(
Ψ
(n+1)
k
+ λˆ
(n+1)
k I
)−1
Θ
(n+1)
k
[(
Ψ
(n+1)
k
+ λˆ
(n+1)
k I
)−1
Θ
(n+1)
k
]H}
= Tr
{(
Θ
(n+1)
k
)H [
P
(n+1)
k
Σ
(n+1)
k
(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
+ λˆ
(n+1)
k I
]−1 [
P
(n+1)
k
Σ
(n+1)
k
(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
+ λˆ
(n+1)
k I
]−1
Θ
(n+1)
k
}
=
(
λˆ
(n+1)
k
)−2
Tr
(P(n+1)k )H Θ(n+1)k (Θ(n+1)k )H P(n+1)k
{
I−
[
λˆ
(n+1)
k
(
Σ
(n+1)
k
)−1
+ I
]−1}2
=
Nk∑
i=1
[(
P
(n+1)
k
)H
Θ
(n+1)
k
(
Θ
(n+1)
k
)H
P
(n+1)
k
]
[i,i][
λˆ
(n+1)
k +
(
Σ
(n+1)
k
)
[i,i]
]2 = pk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} . (44)
Ω
(n+1)
k
,

(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H∑k−1
i=1
{
HeiV¯
(n+1)
i
(
V¯
(n+1)
i
)H
HH
ei
}
U
(n+1)
e,k + σ
2
e
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
U
(n+1)
e,k + I, k = 1,
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H∑
k−1
i=1
{
HeiV
(n+1)
i
(
V
(n+1)
i
)H
HH
ei
}
U
(n+1)
e,k + σ
2
e
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H
U
(n+1)
e,k
+
(
U
(n+1)
e,k
)H∑
K
i=k+1
{
HeiV¯
(n+1)
i
(
V¯
(n+1)
i
)H
HH
ei
}
U
(n+1)
e,k + I, k ∈ {2, . . . ,K} .
(45)
Tr
{
EEve,TXk
[
V˜
(n+1)
k
(
µ˜
(n+1)
k
)]}
= Tr
[
Ω
(n+1)
k
+
(
N
(n+1)
k
)H
V˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
(n+1)
k
+
(
N
(n+1)
k
)H
V˜
(n+1)
k +
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
(n+1)
k
]
= εk. (49)
Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
= Tr
{
NH
[
Φ−1 −Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
(M− µ˜kN)
(
MH − µ˜kN
H
) [
Φ−1
−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]}
= Tr
{
MH
[
Φ−1N−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
NHΦ−1 − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
M
}
− µ˜kTr
{
MH
[
Φ−1N−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
ΓΛΓH − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
]}
− µ˜kTr
{[
ΓΛΓH − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
NHΦ−1 − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
M
}
+ µ˜2kTr
{[
ΓΛΓH − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
ΓΛΓH − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
]}
. (51)
Tr
{
MH
[
Φ−1N−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
NHΦ−1 − ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
M
}
= Tr (Ξ)− 2Tr
[
Λ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHΞΓ
]
+Tr
[
Λ2
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−2
ΓHΞΓ
]
=
dk∑
i=1
Ξ[i,i] −
dk∑
i=1
(
ΓHΞΓ
)
[i,i]
+
dk∑
i=1
(
ΓHΞΓ
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
. (52)
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− µ˜kTr
{
MH
[
Φ−1N−Φ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
ΓHΛΓ− ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
]}
= −µ˜kTr
[
ΛΓHMHΦ−1NΓ−ΛΓHMHΦ−1NΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
−Λ2ΓHMHΦ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
+ΛΓHMHΦ−1NΓ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
Λ2
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1]
= −µ˜k
{
Tr (ΛΠ)− Tr
[(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
Λ2Π
]
− Tr
[(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
Λ2Π
]
+Tr
[
Λ2
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−2
ΛΠ
]}
= −µ˜k
dk∑
i=1
(ΛΠ)[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
. (53)
− µ˜kTr
{[
ΓHΛΓ− ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
NHΦ−1 − ΓHΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΓHNHΦ−1
]
M
}
= −µ˜k
dk∑
i=1
(
ΠHΛ
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
. (54)
µ˜2kTr
{[
ΓHΛΓ− ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
] [
ΓHΛΓ− ΓΛ
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1
ΛΓH
]}
= µ˜2k
{
Tr
(
Λ2
)
− 2Tr
[
Λ3
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−1]
− Tr
[
Λ4
(
Λ− µ˜−1k I
)−2]}
= µ˜2k
dk∑
i=1
(
Λ2
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
. (55)
Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
=
dk∑
i=1
Ξ[i,i] −
dk∑
i=1
(
ΓHΞΓ
)
[i,i]
+
dk∑
i=1
(
ΓHΞΓ
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
− µ˜k
dk∑
i=1
(ΛΠ)[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
− µ˜k
dk∑
i=1
(
ΠHΛ
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
+ µ˜2k
dk∑
i=1
(
Λ2
)
[i,i]
(
1
µ˜kΛ[i,i] − 1
)2
. (56)
Similarly, since the third item of (51) is the conjugate
transpose of (53), we get (54). The last item of (51) is derived
as (55). By substituting (52)-(55) into (51), we arrive at (56).
Secondly, upon substituting (50) into Tr
[
NHV˜
(n+1)
k
]
, we
have (57), where∆ , NHΦ−1M. Likewise, substituting (50)
into Tr
[(
V˜
(n+1)
k
)H
N
]
, we have (58).
Finally, upon substituting (56), (57) and (58) into the eaves-
dropper MSE constraint (49), it is found that µ˜k can be readily
solved from (59), where Ξ =∆∆H and Π = ΓH∆HΓ.
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